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Kent v. City of Columbia Falls: All for One—How Eroding the Public
Duty Doctrine Threatens Modern Society
Megan Timm

I. INTRODUCTION

Defining the scope of a defendant’s duty of care has sparked
heated debate for decades,1 and rightfully so. The obligations we have to
one another dictate our societal structure at its core, for “in the absence
of a duty, there can be no negligence.”2 Tort law, serving as a
“deterrence of antisocial conduct,” purposefully molds our behaviors by
making us financially accountable for our choices.3 That which we
choose to do—and refrain from doing—is directly impacted by both our
duty and the cost of breaching it. As a result, positive behaviors may be
indirectly deterred by demanding compensation when they fall short of
perfection. Policy makers should be cautious not to lose sight of the
greater good in a quest to compensate every harm.
The Public Duty Doctrine prevents tort law from deterring
publicly beneficial services for the sake of a single citizen. By
recognizing that that governmental agents performing public roles owe
their duty to the public, not individuals,4 it prevents citizens from
jeopardizing public services by demanding perfection from them.
Without the doctrine, municipalities may have to terminate services as a
whole in order to compensate a single mistake.
In Kent v. City of Columbia Falls,5 the Court has inexplicably
torn apart the Public Duty Doctrine. It has stretched the boundaries of
public duties to include countless individual citizens like Kent,6 opening
the door to an unprecedented wave of lawsuits against municipalities.
This note discusses the legal errors of the Court’s holding that Kent can
proceed against the City of Columbia Falls on the theory of a voluntarily
assumed duty of ordinary care and argues that public policy supports the
preservation of the Public Duty Doctrine.
II. BACKGROUND
State governments are Constitutionally recognized as sovereign.
As such, they are immune from suit unless they consent to liability.7 As
early as 1788, the principle of absolute immunity was extended to
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
Poole ex rel. Meyer v. Poole, 1 P.3d 936, 939 (Mont. 2000).
3
13 PETER NASH SWISHER, ROBERT E. DRAIM & DAVID D. HUDGINS, VIRGINIA PRACTICE SERIES:
TORT AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW § 1:2 (2015 ed.).
4
Kent v. City of Columbia Falls, 350 P.3d 9, 13 (Mont. 2015).
5
Id.
6
Id. at 19.
7
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
1
2
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municipalities.8 Thereafter, because municipalities and other lower
governmental entities are not themselves sovereign, the principle has
been more aptly referred to as “governmental immunity.”9 Montana
abolished its own sovereign and governmental immunity with the
ratification of the Montana Constitution in 1972.10 While governmental
entities are now liable for their torts, it is important to note that the
Constitution established liability—not strict liability. A plaintiff in any
tort suit must demonstrate a duty, a breach of that duty, causation and
injury in order to recover.11
The Montana Supreme Court has long recognized that when a
governmental agent’s duty is owed to the public, the elements of liability
upon which an individual citizen can recover are not automatically
established.12 This principle was first acknowledged in Montana as the
Public Duty Doctrine in the 1999 case Nelson v. Driscoll.13 In Nelson, a
police officer, suspecting the driver had been drinking, pulled a vehicle
over on an icy road.14 Though he was unable to establish probable cause
to arrest her for DUI, he requested that she and her passenger—both of
whom admitted to drinking over the course of the evening—refrain from
driving home.15 Trina, the decedent, led the officer to believe she would
call a friend for a ride.16 Shortly thereafter, while walking along a
roadway, Trina was killed by a passing motorist.17 While considering the
officer’s duty to Trina, the Montana Supreme Court analyzed a Utah
court’s holding18 that circumstantial exceptions to a publicly owed duty
can establish an additional duty to an individual citizen.19 Following
Utah, four exceptions were adopted by the Court in Nelson:
A special relationship can be established (1) by a statute
intended to protect a specific class of persons of which
the plaintiff is a member from a particular type of harm;
(2) when a government agent undertakes specific action
to protect a person or property; (3) by governmental
actions that reasonably induce detrimental reliance by a
Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. R. 359 (1788).
Mackin v. State, 621 P.2d 477, 480 (Mont. 1980).
10
Lee C. Baxter, Note, Gonzales v. City of Bozeman: The Public Duty Doctrine's Unconstitutional
Treatment of Government Defendants in Tort Claims, 72 MONT. L. REV. 299, 301 (2011).
11
2 BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 16:21, 0.5 (2d ed.
2015).
12
E.g., Gatlin-Johnson ex rel. Gatlin v. City of Miles City, 291 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Mont. 2012);
Gonzales v. City of Bozeman, 217 P.3d 487, 491 (Mont. 2009); Nelson v. State, 195 P.3d 293, 300
(Mont. 2008); Nelson v. Driscoll, 983 P.2d 972, 977 (Mont. 1999).
13
Driscoll, 983 P.2d at 978.
14
Id. at 975.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 976.
18
Day v. State, 980 P.2d 1171, 1175 (Utah 1999).
19
Driscoll, 983 P.2d at 978.
8
9
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member of the public; and (4)under certain
circumstances, when the agency has actual custody of
the plaintiff or of a third person who causes harm to the
plaintiff.20
There are distinct grounds, therefore, upon which a
governmental agent can be held liable to an individual even while
performing his public duty. Despite the concurrence’s classification of
the Public Duty Doctrine in Kent as the “reviving… [of] governmental
immunity for torts… by resort to a judicially-created theory,”21 this fact
makes the two doctrines fundamentally distinguishable. Governmental
immunity, like its sovereign predecessor, shielded entities from liability
even when established duties were tortiously breached. The Public Duty
Doctrine, on the other hand, simply recognizes that—as in all tort law—
liability cannot exist when an individual is not within the scope of the
actor’s duty. When governmental agents are fulfilling a duty to the
general public, such as fire and police protection22 or land use regulation,
individual citizens that aren’t privy to a “special relationship” are not
within that scope.23
That the legislature never intended to impose strict liability upon
governmental units—the practical result of infinitely expanding the
scope of duty—is underscored by the statutory definition of a “claim”
against such entities at Mont. Code Ann. § 2–9–101(1). Adopted
concurrently with the abolition of sovereign immunity, the statute
explains that claims can be brought “under circumstances in which that
entity, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for damages.”24
The plain language of this statute places the same limits on the duty of
governmental units as does the Public Duty Doctrine. While they are no
longer immune from suits when a duty and breach are established,
instances must be recognized when the government does not have a duty
to ensure the optimal outcome of each and every individual citizen.
These instances occur, as aptly labeled by the majority in the present
case, when governmental agents perform “uniquely governmental”25
activities.
III. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Casey Kent was killed in a skateboarding accident in a Planned Unit
Development (PUD) in Columbia Falls, Montana.26 Because a PUD
Id.
Kent, 350 P.3d at 21.
22
Gonzales, 217 P.3d at 491.
23
Driscoll, 983 P.2d at 978.
24
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–9–101(1) (2013).
25
Kent, 350 P.3d at 18.
26
Id. at 10.
20
21
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“gives local governments and developers greater flexibility in designing
a proposed subdivision than would be allowed with a traditional
subdivision,”27 the City of Columbia Falls played a direct role in its
development. City planners made site visits, mandated the installation
and location of walking and bike trails and “retained the right to ‘approve
of the design and location of the trails prior to the start of
construction.’”28 Casey’s wife, Sara, brought numerous claims against
the City.29 Those that relate to her appeal alleged that the City voluntarily
assumed statutory duties and a duty of ordinary care by taking part in and
authorizing the PUD’s design.30 The District Court determined that the
Public Duty Doctrine applied to the City’s duty31 and proceeded to
analyze Sara’s claims under the recognized exceptions to the doctrine.32
The court established that there was no evidence supporting a special
relationship between Kent and the City,33 nor was the statute that granted
the City the authority to oversee the development one designed to protect
citizens like Kent.34 The District Court granted summary judgment for
the City on both claims.35 Sara appealed, requesting that the Supreme
Court reconsider the Public Duty Doctrine’s applicability to the facts of
her case.36
IV. HOLDING
Sara reiterated two theories of liability on appeal.37 Both were
characterized as voluntarily assumed duties private in nature38 so as to
extend the scope of the City’s public duty to include her husband. First,
she asserted that the City had assumed a statutory duty to regulate the
walking path by ADA standards, which it failed to do.39 The Court
allowed her to proceed on this theory.40 Second, she asserted that the
City had voluntarily assumed a duty of reasonable care by working with
the developer to design and approve the walking path.41 The Court
concluded that because “many of the City's actions were similar to those
that would be typically undertaken by the architects, contractors, and
27
28

Id. at 11.

Id. at 11–12.

Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 14.
31
Kent, 350 P.3d at 15.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 13.
36
Id. at 14.
37
Kent, 350 P.3d at 16.
38
Id. at 14.
39
Id. at 18.
40
Id. at 19.
41
Id. at 14.
29
30
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engineers,”42 the City had exceeded the scope of its public duty to
regulate land usage.43 Sara was allowed to proceed on this theory as
well.44 The District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the City of
Columbia Falls was reversed and the case was remanded for further
proceedings on both of Sara’s claims.45 This note focuses exclusively on
the implications of the Court’s holding as to her second theory of liability
– that City agents voluntarily assumed a duty of ordinary care by
performing their public duties.
V. THE PRIVATE PERSON STANDARD
The Legislature created a statutory mechanism for the Court to
use in determining when the Public Duty Doctrine applies.46 By
definition, a “claim” that can be brought against a governmental entity
must arise from a duty that is private in nature.47 Therefore, suits arising
out of duties to the public are effectively barred by statute. The statute
reads as follows:
“Claim” means any claim against a governmental entity,
for money damages only, that any person is legally
entitled to recover as damages because of personal injury
or property damage caused by a negligent or wrongful
act or omission committed by any employee of the
governmental entity while acting within the scope of
employment, under circumstances where the
governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant for the damages under the laws of the
state.48
This statute serves two logical purposes in regulating suits
against governmental entities. First, it prevents a gradual shift toward
strict liability - that is, “liability imposed without regard to the
defendant's negligence or intent to cause harm.”49 As there can be no
negligence without a duty to the plaintiff,50 presumptively including
every citizen within the scope of the duty of a governmental agent
Id. at 18.
Kent, 350 P.3d at 18.
44
Id. at 19.
45
Id. at 19–20.
46
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–9–101.
47
Id at § 2–9–101.
48
Id at § 2–9–101.
42
43

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) 4 Scope Note
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
49

50

Massee v. Thompson, 90 P.3d 394, 400 (Mont. 2004).
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imposes liability without due consideration of negligence. The “private
person” standard ensures that governmental entities are only liable to
individuals when their injuries are within the scope of the entity’s duty.
Second, the statute serves as a roadmap to identifying when a
governmental agent is operating within the protected scope of his public
duties. The Second Edition of American Jurisprudence on Municipal,
County, School, and State Tort Liability explains that:
Subject to some exceptions, the public-duty doctrine
shields the State and its political subdivisions from tort
liability arising out of discretionary government actions
that, by their nature, are not ordinarily performed by
private persons.51
The statutory definition of a viable claim against a government entity
codifies this principle by reiterating the “private person” standard of the
Public Duty Doctrine52 and establishes a straightforward mechanism for
distinguishing between public and private duties: when a government
actor takes an action that a private person would “not ordinarily
perform,”53 the statute assumes that the duty owed was to the public –
not to any individual citizen. Unless a “special relationship”54 creates an
added duty to an individual, these public duties cannot give rise to a
claim against the entity performing them under Montana law.55
The “private person” standard was reflected in the Court’s recent
holding in Gatlin-Johnson ex rel. Gatlin v. City of Miles City,56 discussed
extensively by the majority in Kent. In Gatlin-Johnson, the Court held
the City of Miles City liable to a child injured on a slide at a City-owned
park by way of premises liability.57 Because a private person would have
been liable to Gatlin-Johnson under the circumstances, a “specific duty”
to her was established and the Public Duty Doctrine was inapplicable.58
As the Gatlin-Johnson majority explained, “[The Public Duty Doctrine]
does not apply where the government's duty is defined by other generally
applicable principles of law.”59 The Gatlin-Johnson Court continued on
to point out a rich history of cases against governmental entities on
“generally applicable principles of law” such as premises liability. 60 The
common-law history of the state and the statute were clearly aligned at
57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 76 (2015).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–9–101(1).
53
57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability, supra note 51, § 76.
54
Driscoll, 983 P.2d at 978.
55
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–9–101(1).
56
Gatlin-Johnson, 291 P.3d at 1133.
57
Id. at 1134.
58
Id. at 1133.
59
Id.
51
52

60

Id.
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the time the Court considered Kent. Because the District Court had
established that no special relationship applied to the facts of the case,61
there was only one way Kent could proceed: the Court had to pinpoint a
“generally applicable principle of law” that would apply to a “private
person” as well as the City.
VI. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE
In Kent, the Court’s reasoning proceeded off the beaten path
when it allowed Sara to proceed against the City on a theory of a
voluntarily assumed duty of ordinary care.62 Because there was no
premise liability upon which Sara could bring suit,63 she instead
characterized the City’s actions in permitting the walking path as beyond
the scope of its public duty.64 In order to support its acceptance of this
argument, the Court referenced various actions that the City took during
the design and permitting process to make it clear that its agents
exercised strict regulatory authority over the project and the walking path
itself.65 It then likened the City’s role to that of an architect or
contractor,66 but included as a key piece of its argument the fact that the
city manager “retained the right to ‘approve of the design and location of
the trails prior to the start of construction.’”67
While this paints a picture of guilt for the reader, the Court’s
reasoning undermines itself when compared to the “private person”
standard. Threatening the viability of an entire building project to compel
conformance to a set of desired specifications is a “uniquely
governmental activity,” despite the Court’s unsupported assertion to the
contrary.68 The manner the City chose to enforce its authority69 did not
transform the duty to exercise it responsibly into one that a private
person, contractor or architect could assume. Although the Court chose
not to expressly overturn the Public Duty Doctrine, this decision has
undercut it at its core by detaching the it from the “private person”
standard.
The Court has given municipalities no way to determine from
this ruling where the invisible line between public duty and a voluntary
assumption of a duty of ordinary care lies. Instead, it drew an arbitrary
distinction between the two based on a unique fact set without addressing
the legitimately protected bounds of the City’s duties or how it should
Kent, 350 P.3d at 15.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 15.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 18.
66
Id.
67
Kent, 350 P.3d at 18.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 19.
61
62
63
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have acted to stay within them. Realistically, any and all action by a
government agent could be deemed a “voluntary assumption” of a duty
of reasonable care by this vague standard. We can now expect an
inpouring of litigation against municipalities forced to defend the actual
boundaries of their public duties. Notwithstanding its apparent
enthusiasm for doing away with the Public Duty Doctrine, the least the
majority could have done is lay out a firm rationale for governmental
entities to use to define the scope of protected duties and act safely
within them.
VII. PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC DUTY
The majority holding in Kent undermines public policy by
threatening the ability of municipalities to provide basic services to
residents. Montana statutorily recognizes the provision of basic services
as a policy objective.70 A municipality’s ability to achieve this goal,
however, is dependent upon its long-term financial stability.71
Threatening this stability by opening the door to a new wave of lawsuits
is inconsistent with public policy and hazardous to public health and
safety.
Municipal bankruptcy does not automatically impact a city’s
ability to provide basic services to its residents. In fact, the program is
designed to free up resources for these services by allowing a city to
restructure its debt.72 In recent years, numerous cities have sought
bankruptcy protection to deal with the blow of a lawsuit. 73 In these cases,
when the lawsuit is an isolated event, restructuring is an effective way to
relieve the burden.74 Overturning the Public Duty Doctrine, on the other
hand, does not create the risk of an isolated event. Instead, it bulldozes
the last barrier to citizen suits for imperfectly performed public services,
effectively creating an “underlying fiscal problem”75 in the form of
unrestrained vulnerability to successive lawsuits. As Winegarden
explains, “municipal bankruptcy only provides relief if the underlying
fiscal problems are addressed.”76 When the problem is ongoing or
recurring, cities cannot complete the lengthy bankruptcy recovery
process to regain financial stability. After a city declares bankruptcy,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 7–11–201 (2013).
Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1120 (2014).
72
Wayne H. Winegarden, Going Broke One City at a Time: Municipal Bankruptcies in America,
PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, at *7.
73
Richard Levin, Jonathan Solomon & Campbell Agyapong, Some Causes of Municipal Distress
and Bankruptcy, NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS 3, 6, 7, 9 (June 2011), available at
http://perma.cc/Y69A-MVZA.
74
Steven Eide, More Bankruptcies Won’t Solve Cities’ Problems, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Aug. 1, 2013),
available at http://perma.cc/R26J-ZGG4.
75
Winegarden, supra note 72, at *5.
76
Id.
70
71
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heightened borrowing rates77 and a negative stigma attached to the city
inhibit economic development.78 In itself, impaired economic
development adds an additional strain on the city’s long-term recovery:
The lower incentive to conduct business in a
municipality that has declared bankruptcy weakens the
regional economic environment and further erodes the
future tax revenue base.79
If the city fails to rectify the problems that caused its insolvency
in the first place, an additional financial blow in this prolonged weakened
state can be devastating.80 Without the Public Duty Doctrine, every
citizen that receives suboptimal results from public services can demand
recovery. Even if careful decision making minimizes the frequency of
ensuing suits, Winegarden’s analysis makes it clear that recurring
burdens negate the benefits of restructuring.81 When bankruptcy no
longer frees up resources because previous fiscal wounds are unhealed,
underfunded public services will gradually begin to suffer. 82
The health and well-being of citizens residing in a city with
deteriorating public services is directly at risk. Michelle Wilde Anderson,
Assistant Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law, analyzes in her
article The New Minimal Cities the ethical component of insolvent
municipalities’ decisions to cut basic services.83 Due to cutbacks in
police personnel in many struggling cities, “911 can rarely dispatch an
officer for a call reporting a non-violent crime, such as car theft, drug
dealing, or prostitution.”84 The City Attorney of San Bernardino,
California is quoted as recommending that citizens “Lock your doors and
load your guns.”85 Another familiar, albeit extreme, example of life with
dissolving public services can be seen in Detroit. Although lawsuits were
not the cause of the city’s burdens, the purpose of analyzing Detroit’s
condition in this context was best stated by journalist Charlie LeDuff
when he said, “You better look at Detroit, because that’s what happens
when you run out of money.”86
By the time Detroit officially declared bankruptcy in 2013,87 the
situation for citizens had already deteriorated to dangerous levels. In late
Eide, supra note 74.
Winegarden, supra note 72, at *4.
79
Id.
80
Id. at *3.
81
Id. at *5.
82
Anderson, supra note 71, at 1120.
83
Id. at 1122.
84
Id. at 1120.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 1128.
77
78

87

Winegarden, supra note 72, at *10.
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2012, the police force hosted a rally to remind Detroit citizens and
visitors to “Enter at your Own Risk” because officers were “overworked,
understaffed, and at times, fearful for their lives.”88 Less than a year
later, days after filing for bankruptcy protection, the Wall Street Journal
reported that “citizens wait an average of 58 minutes for the police to
respond to their calls, compared to the national average of 11
minutes.”89 Bankruptcy did little, if anything, to ameliorate citizen woes.
In 2014, the UN was called in when the city disconnected the water of
27,000 homes with past-due bills90 in an effort to reduce its debt.91 Even
a lack of seemingly inconsequential activities like animal control have
wreaked havoc city life.92 A 2013 news report by Bloomberg Business
reports:
As many as 50,000 stray dogs roam the streets and
vacant homes of bankrupt Detroit…Dens of as many as
20 canines have been found in boarded-up homes in the
community of about 700,000 that once pulsed with 1.8
million people. One officer in the Police Department's
skeleton animal-control unit recalled a pack splashing
away in a basement that flooded when thieves ripped out
water pipes.93
Detroit’s decline has been decades in the making, which is precisely the
point: the effect of long-term financial instability poses a threat to the
daily life of municipal residents. And, as long as the root of the problem
is unsolved, long-term instability is essentially unavoidable.94
The Court’s holding in Kent opens the floodgates of litigation
against municipalities and threatens the long-term health, well-being and
even the lives of citizens. Long-term financial instability with such
potential repercussions as declining education, failing sanitation systems
and uncontrolled crime doesn’t just pose a risk to the taxpayers’
pocketbooks; it poses a risk to their health. Granted, a long road lies
between the Court’s holding in Kent and a crime-ridden society fraught
with trash and feral dogs. The road between municipal lawsuits and
CBS Detroit, Enter at Your Own Risk: Police Union Says ‘War-Like’ Detroit Is Unsafe
For Visitors, DETROIT.CBSLOCAL.COM (Oct. 6, 2012) available at http://perma.cc/62RT-2KTH.
89
Matthew Dolan, Record Bankruptcy for Detroit, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 19, 2013),
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323993804578614144173709204
90
UN News Centre, In Detroit, city-backed water shut-offs ‘contrary to human rights, say UN
experts, UN.ORG, (Oct. 20, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/9B8R-EMDD.
91
Bill Mitchell, In Detroit, Water Crisis Symbolizes Decline, and Hope, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC
(Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/V6WZ-AY7Z.
92
Chris Christoff, Abandoned Dogs Roam Detroit in Packs as Humans Dwindle, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS, (Aug. 20, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/6M34-RTAQ.
93
Id.
94
Winegarden, supra note 72, at *5.
88
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bankruptcy is shorter, though,95 and the Court has taken the first step
along it by conflating public and private duties. Upholding the Public
Duty Doctrine means that some harms go uncompensated in the name of
society. But, by the same token, society as we know it may be
jeopardized in the name of compensating every harm.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In weighing the value of laws to our society, we must consider
benefits against the risks. Even the best laws result in suboptimal
outcomes for some citizens.
A seat-belted driver trapped in a burning vehicle may suffer
harm at the hands of the “click it or ticket” law, but to overturn an
otherwise life-saving traffic law to prevent that harm is nonsensical.
Similarly, services provided for the public, such as police and fire
protection and land use regulation, do not provide optimal results for all.
A hostage may die while police negotiate to save the lives of a hundred
others. A building may be destroyed to stop a town from burning to the
ground. An undertrained or careless municipal employee may have too
much responsibility delegated to him in order to maintain an acceptable
pace of overall economic development. As a society, we have had a
choice to make: accept that we may occasionally suffer a harm in an
otherwise publicly beneficial system and trust that our gains outweigh
our losses, or demand optimal results for every individual and recognize
that public services as we understand them may cease to exist as a result.
By allowing Kent to proceed on a theory of a voluntary assumed duty of
ordinary care and effectively undercutting the Public Duty Doctrine, the
Court’s knee-jerk reaction has made this decision for us—perhaps at a
greater cost than we realize.

95

Levin, Solomon & Agyapong, supra note 73, at 3.

